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IN THE SUPRffi\,fE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the ~latter of the Estate of 
AL:\IA LEON HIATT, Deceased. 
CI•:CIL J. HIATT, 
Petitioner and Respondc:ntJ No. 
9963 
vs. 
JEX L. HL\TT, Joint Administrator, 
et al., Objectors and Appellants. 
APPELL~TS BRIEF 
ST.A.TE~IENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal frmn an order in a probate pro-
ceeding making a family allowance to the widow of the 
decedent where the widow had executed an antenuptial 
agreement waiving and relinquishing both as wife and 
widow all her rights In the property owned by the 
decedent. 
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DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The trial judge a warded the widow the sum of 
$250 per month as widow's allowance without recording 
any testimony as to her needs or her own financial con-
dition or prior living standard of the widow of the 
deceased. The court held that the execution of the ante-
nuptial agreement did not constitute a waiver of a fam-
ily allowance even though the allowance did necessarily 
require the use of funds and assets of the decedent 
which he owned at the time of its execution. 
RELIE~-. SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek an order vacating the judg· 
ment whereby the allowance was made, and in the alter· 
native, seek a new trial upon the grounds that, insofar 
as the amount of the allowance is concerned, it is un· 
supported by the evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 20, 1961, A. L. Hiatt, deceased, and 
Cecil J. Hiatt, the respondent, executed an antenuptial 
agreement (Ex. I, R. 73-74, attached to this brief, for 
convenience as Appendix A). The parties recited that 
they were contemplating marriage as husband and wife 
under the laws of the state of Utah, and that each owned 
"certain real and personal property, and it is their 
desire to settle the property rights as husband and wife 
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after such marriage . . . " The agreement recites that 
''whereas the wife desires to waive and relinquish any 
and all rights. either as wife or as widow, including 
right of dower. in and to any and all property now owned 
hv the husband ... "; that she "understood and agreed 
that all of the property of any name or nature, real, 
llt'J'sonal or mixed. wherever they may be found, belong-
ing to the husband for the contemplated marriage, shall 
be and remain forever his personal estate, and this shall 
include all interest, rents and profits which may in time 
accrue or result in any manner from increase in value, 
or be collected for the use of the same in any way." 
She specifically agreed to execute and acknowledge 
any appropriate instruments to enable the husband or 
his heirs devisees, personal representatives or assigns 
to give free and marketable title to his real estate. 
The parties concluded their agreement with the 
promise that "It is understood and agreed that each 
party to this agreement shall control their personal 
estate as described herein, and do with the properties 
thereof whatsoever they wish and will, by his or her 
orders and directions, or by testament, the same as either 
could or would do if no marriage relation existed be-
tween them." 
The parties were married the next day and lived 
as husband and wife for approximately one year. At 
that time a divorce proceeding was commenced by the 
respondent against the deceased in Utah Count; and 
the parties negotiated for a property settlement in the 
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divorce action whereby Mrs. Hiatt would accept $1,000 
in lieu of alimony and she would receive a Maytag 
washer and lawn mower acquired by the parties since 
the marriage, in full settlement of her claim against 
the decedent. The deceased acknowledged that he had 
no interest in the real property owned by her even 
though his name appeared as a joint tenant of record. 
This piece of real property had been conveyed by the 
respondent to herself and her husband as joint tenants 
in order that she could obtain the benefits of his veteran's 
exemption. In fact, he did not even claim any interest 
in the property. Mrs. Hiatt acknowledged such fact 
when she signed the stipulation (R. 78). He died prior 
to the execution of the proposed stipulation. 
Prior to his decease, A. L. Hiatt had conveyed all 
of his property to a nephew. The joint administrators 
of the estate filed a civil action against the grantee and 
his wife, and the children as heirs of the deceased filed a 
separate action praying that all of the property con-
veyed to the nephew, both in the nature of realty and 
personalty, be recovered for the estate or the heirs 
(R. 28, 36). The defendants in those actions appeared 
and consented to convey the property into court. The 
children of the deceased subsequently consented that 
the property all be probated as the estate of the dece-
dent. 
On November 16, 1962, Jex L. Hiatt filed a Peti-
tion for Declaratory Judgment urging that the court 
determine and adjudicate (a) the heirs at law of the 
deceased; (b) that Cecil J. Hiatt is entitled to no share 
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in the assrts of the estate; (c) that the respondent's 
duties as joint administrator be terminated and letters 
to her be revoked as a result of the conflict in interest 
hd ,,·t·en her a rul the estate, and for various other relief 
whid1 is not material to this appeal. This petition was 
opposed by respondent and set down for hearing on 
t ht.• trial calendar ( R. 49) . 
On .January 31, 1963, respondent filed a Petition 
for Family Allowance. The petition came on for hear-
ing on February 15, and the court proceeded to hear 
the matter. even though the Petition for Declaratory 
.Judgment involYing many of the same questions was 
on the trial calendar, having been filed substantially 
no days earlier. J ex L. Hiatt and the other children 
of the deceased opposed the petition on the ground 
that respondent had waived her right to any assets of 
the deceased under the terms of the antenuptial agree-
ment. 
It is undisputed that the property owned by dece-
dent at the time of the execution of the antenuptial 
ngrcement is the same as that being probated by the 
court. 
... -\t the time of the hearing on the widow's 
petition, there was no suggestion that the antenuptial 
a~rreement had been induced by fraud or was the result 
of ovet-reaching, nor was there any suggestion that the 
1 agreement was not fair or reasonable. In fact, the con-
tracting parties each had children by prior marriages ; 
1 each was advised of the other's property and each wanted 
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their respective property to pass to their children upon 
their death rather than to their respective spouses or the 
children of their respective spouses. The only question 
presented for the trial court's determination insofar 
as the validity of the agreement was concerned was 
whether it constituted a bar to a claim for family allow-
ance by the widow. This question involved only the 
construction of the agreement, the execution of which 
was admitted. 
\Vithout taking testimony and without any show-
ing as to the needs of the widow, and without hearing 
any evidence as to the reasonableness of the amount, 
Judge Harding entered an order allowing the widow 
$250 per month to be paid from the estate, the allowance 
to relate back to the death of decedent, and determined 
that the respondent "has not heretofore waived her 
rights to a family allowance." (R. 69, 71). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
THE EXECUTION OF THE ANTENUPTIAL 
AGREEl\1:ENT DID NOT BAR THE WIDOW 
FROM CLAIMING A FAMILY ALLOWANCE 
PAY ABLE OUT OF THE ASSETS OF THE 
ESTATE. 
It is undisputed that the parties executed the ante-
nuptial agreement in question the day before their 
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mnrringe. The provisions of the agreement are not in 
dispute awl a eopy of the instrument is attached to 
this brief as 1\ppendix A for the convenience of the 
rourt. 
The trial judge apparently reasoned that since 
!luTe was no explicit provision in the instrument refer-
ring. as such, to a waiver of family allowance, the right 
ton t'amily allowance should not be denied. This ruling 
is at ,·:u·iance with the applicable authorities. 
X o lTtah case has been found. The prevailing 
view in the decisions in other jurisdictions is to the effect 
that where the language of an antenuptial agreement 
provides substantially that the widow waives her right 
to all of the property of the deceased, both as wife and 
widow, such language bars her from claiming any sums 
which she would otherwise receive under a statute pro-
,·iding for a family or widow's allowance. The California 
statute. for exan1ple, is virtually identical with Section 
i.)-H-1 lT.C.A. 1953, under which respondent was given 
nn allowance in the instant case. In at least two in-
stances. California courts have ruled that where a widow 
has waiYed her rights in her husband's property in an 
antenuptial agreement, she was barred from claiming 
any allowance under the statute. 
In the caseIn re Schwartz~s Estate ( 1947) 79 Cal. 
App. (2d) 308, 179 P. (2d) 868, the agreement recited 
that a marriage was contemplated, and recited that the 
parties desired to make provisions with respect to prop-
~ erty to the widow "in lieu of the rights, which after the 
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consummation of said marriage, said party of the second 
part might or could have, as wife, or widow, or other-
wise in said real and personal properties which said 
party of the first part has, or may hereafter own." The 
intended wife agreed to accept certain property "in 
place and instead of all rights, which, as widow of 
party of the first part she might otherwise have, either 
as a homestead community interest or otherwise or as 
a distributive share of the estate, by operation of law." 
The court held that the language "all rights, which, 
as party of the first part she might otherwise have, 
either as a widow or wife" was effective to constitute 
a waiver under the statute. The court said: 
"The language of the court in Estate of Yoell, 
164 Cal. 540, 550, 129 P. 999, 1003, which in-
volved the question of whether a widow had 
waived her right to a family allowance, is co-
gently applicable to the cause now before us: 
'To esatblish such relinquishment of right, no 
more apt words could be chosen than those de-
liberately employed in the agreement under 
consideration. True, it does not in terms and by 
name relinquish the right to a family allowance, 
but it does more than this. The wife covenants 
that she has renounced and waived all claims 
which she has or rnay have as heir of the husband 
or as his surviving te-'ife. It is only as heir and 
surviving wife that she could make her demand 
for a family allowance~ a demand which she hcu 
solemnly renounced.~ (Emphasis added.) See 
also Estate of McCoy, 51 Cal. App. 2d 483, 125 
P.2d 71. 
"Application of the 'clear and explicit l~n­
guage' test to the wording of the agreement w1th 
10 
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whi('h we are here concerned convinces us that 
nppellant thereby surrendered her right to a fan1-
ily allowance." 
The agreement provided In re 1ll cCoys Estate 
IJ!q:!) ;)} Cal. i\pp. (2d} 483, 1:!5 P. (2d}71, in part 
thnt "ea('ll party hereby wai,·es any claim to inherit 
any share or portion of the estate of the other by heir-
-.hip. decedent, succession or otherwise, unless by the 
will of the decedent." The court quoted from The Estate 
of Yoc/1 the same language quoted in Schwartz's Estate1 
<.'om.·huling that the parties intended that the wife was 
not to share in any benefits of the husband's property 
upon his decease. The court said: 
"\Ye conclude, therefore, that taking the agree-
ment as a whole and applying to it the elemen-
tary rules of construction, appellant in and by 
said agreetnent waived her right to a family al-
lowance and that the trial court did not error in 
denying her petition therefor." 
The widow I 11 re Sum merville1s Estate1 64 S.D. 
:::~~. :!titl X.\r-. 158-15D, accepted the terms of an ante-
nuptial agreement "as and for complete settlement of 
ally and all clai1ns 1 may have or assert against all 
property left by you at the time of your death." The 
court held: 
..... the language used in the agreetnent is 
clear and unambiguous. The petitioner said in 
the contract that she accepted the [benefits of 
the agreement] . . . in complete settlement of 
'any and all' claims she might have or assert ... 
'All' means everything to which it is applied." 
11 
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The trial court's judgment making the widow an allow-
ance was reversed. 
In Maher v. Knauss (Colo. 1962) 370 P.(2d) 
1017, the widow had bargained in an antenuptial agree-
ment to "waive any right to widow's allowance except 
that she is made a beneficiary under a later will executed 
by said second party . . . " The court said, affirming 
the judgment of the trial court: 
"This language appears clear enough. It is 
not ambiguous and admits of no construction 
other than to apply the words used. 
"The term widow's allowance can only mean 
the statutory widow's allowance, there being no 
other such allowance provided by law. Plaintiff 
in error argues that the term 'widow's allowance' 
as used in the antenuptial agreement might refer 
as well to a waiver of the right of the widow to 
take one-half of the estate. We do not agree with 
this contention ... " 
The court noted that the parties had additionally ex· 
pressly waived the right to take one-half of the estate 
of the other in the event of death. 
In Montana rule is the same. In re Oppenheimer's 
Estate (1925) 73 Mont. 560, 238 P. 599, the agree· 
n1ent is quoted in full in the decision. The substance of 
it is that the widow waived her right to the real property 
of her intended husband in one paragraph and her right 
to any of his personal property in a second paragraph. 
The agreement in substance was that she would not 
make any claim against any property he left as an 
12 
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rstatc but there was no explicit waiver of family allow-
arwc. The court held that the agreement constituted a 
waiver of the statutory allowance for support provided 
umlt'r the ~[ontana statute. The court stated that the 
npplicahle rule of construction was to give effect to 
the intention of the parties in the same manner of effect-
ing intention in the interpretation of other agreements. 
l.t said: 
"In order that the intended wife's relinquish-
ment of her interest in her husband's estate may 
include the statutory allowance for support, it 
is not necessary that such allowance shall be ex-
pressly named. 13 R.C.L. p. 1041, Sec. 61." 
The court reasoned that the only 1nanner in which 
the proposed allowance for support could be paid would 
he out of the assets of the estate. Since the widow had 
waived any right to the assets in the estate, it necessarily 
' followed that she had waived the right to widow's allow-
ance. See particularly the reasoning of the court as it 
applied to the real property on page 601-602 of the 
Pacific Reporter. The court concluded: 
I»· 
"Our conclusions in regard to the proper in-
terpretation of paragraphs 6 and 7 of the agree-
ment are fortified by a consideration of the word-
ing of paragraph 9, wherein it is declared to be 
the understanding and agreement of the parties 
that the payments mentioned in paragraph 8 are 
to be in full satisfaction of ( 1) appellant's claim 
for dower in the real estate, ( 2) all interest in the 
personal property to which she would be en-
titled as the widow of the deceased, and ( 3) in 
full satisfaction of all claims thereinbefore stated. 
13 
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To give the last clause any significance at all, it 
must mean something besides the dower rights 
and the inheritable interest in the real and per-
sonal property of the deceased. 
"Reading this antenuptial agreement as a 
whole, taking into consideration the situation of 
the parties, the subject-matter covered, and the 
language used, we are forced to the conclusion 
that it was the intent of the appellant and de-
ceased in entering into it, that the payments to 
be made to appellant should cover all interest, 
claim, and demand which she might have or assert 
at any time against him, his estate, or property, 
including her claim for a widow's allowance 
pending the administration of his estate." 
Vincent v. Martin (1932) 91 Colo. 106, 11 P.(2d) 
1089, applying and following the earlier case of Brimble 
v. Sickler, 83 Colo. 494, 266 P. 497, holds that the lan-
guage "In full satisfaction of any and all rights of 
dower, statutory allowances and rights of inheritance 
as surviving widow" include the right to a widow's al-
lowance. In the later case the court said: 
"The case of Brimble v. Sickler, 83 Colo. 494, 
496, 266 P. 497, is directly in point and conclu· 
sive of the question here presented. Therein a 
contract containing a waiver of 'any and all 
clain1 of every kind and nature in and to any 
moneys, real and personal property, and other 
assets of every kind that might be due to either 
from the estate of the other as widow or husband 
or heir or in any other manner,' was held to in· 
elude a widow's allowance. Therein the court 
stated: 
14 
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.. ·\Vas the widow entitled to the allowance? 
It setms clear that she was not. By paragraph 4, 
just quoted, she waived her right to anything 
"that might be due" to her "from the estate of 
her husband "as widow." The widow's allowance, 
being a claim against the estate (Dry Goods 
Co. v. Bank & Trust Co., 75 Colo. 451, 226 
P.293~ \Vilson v. Wilson, 55 Colo. 70, 77, 132 
P. 67; Remington v. Remington, 72 Colo. 132, 
209 P.802) is "due from the estate," and with-
out question is due to her "as widow"; indeed, 
we believe it is the only thing that is so due. 
Then she has waived it. 
" 'It is claimed that a waiver of the widow's 
allowance must be express. Deeble v. Alerton, 
58 Colo. 166, 143 P. 1096, Ann., Cas. 1916C, 
863; Wilson v. Wilson, supra. If that means that 
the words "widow's allowance" must be used, 
we do not agree with it. This court has not so 
held. If it means that there must be some term 
which clearly comprehends the scope of those 
words, it is here, as we have shown above, and 
admits of no doubt.' " 
In Guhl t'. Guhl, 376 Ill. 100, 33 N.E. (2d) 185, 
the facts are remarkably siinilar to the case at bar. Both 
the intended wife and husband had previously been 
married and had children by previous marriages. The 
agreement pro,·ided in its recitals that the parties 
~ intended that the property of each would "become the 
property of and descend to the respective chil~ or chil-
dren of the parties hereto as the same would in the event 
~ said marriage was not solemnized." The trial court 
~~ ordered a widow's allowance notwithstanding such Ian-
15 
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guage. Its decree was reversed by the Supreme Court 
of Illinois. The court said: 
"In construing an ante-nuptial agreement the 
rules governing construction and interpretation 
of contracts generally are applicable. To arrive 
at a proper conclusion of the terms of a contract, 
it should be considered in its entirety to ascer-
tain its general scope or purpose for out of that 
will come the real intention of parties. Collins r. 
Phillips, 259 Ill. 405, 102 N.E. 796, Ann. Cas. 
1914C, 188; Seuss v. Schukat, supra. Words used 
need not be cast into a particular form to con-
stitute such a contract, they may be informal 
ones; all that is required is a manifestation of 
the intentions of the parties. Those intentions 
will prevail if they can be given effect in law 
or equity. Hudnall v. Ham, 183 Ill. 486, 56 
N.E. 172,48 L.R.A. 557, 75 Am. St. Rep. 124.4 
Resort will be had to the recitals of a contract 
if necessary to determine the intention of the 
parties and the operative provisions thereof. 
Dunlop v. Lamb, 182 Ill. 319, 55 N.E. 3544." 
(Emphasis supplied). 
The court held that the recitals indicated that the 
parties intended that their respective property would 
pass to their children and not to each other. Since the 
widow's allowance would necessarily have to be paid 
out of the property of the deceased, her agreement bar· 
red her claim to the statutory allowance . 
In the instant case both parties to the intended 
marriage had children by their previous marriages. Both 
intended that their property would go to their respec· 
tive children. Each was willing to forego his or her 
16 
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claim to the properly of the other at the time of the 
t·xrt·ution of the agreement. The agreement recited 
that the respondent "desires to waive and relinquish 
any and all rights, either a.Y 'Wife or as 'Wido'W_, including 
right of dower, in and to any and all property now 
owned by the husband." She agreed "that all of the 
property of any name or nature, real, personal or mixed, 
whrrever they may be found, belonging to the husband 
bdore their contemplated marriage, shall be and remain 
forever his personal estate, and this shall include all 
interests, rents and profits which may in time accrue 
or result in any manner frorn increase in value, or be 
~.·ollected for the use of the same in any way ... " Each 
party waived his rights to the other's property "as ... 
if no marriage relation existed between them." 
It is subxnitted that the effect of the trial court's 
judgment is to frustrate the intention of the agreement 
of the parties. The widow has been permitted to assert 
a claim which she agreed should would not assert. The 
court ought not to lend its powers to achieve such an 
inequitable result. The trial judge's order should be 
reversed by this court with directions to disallow the 
claim. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT $250 A 
~IOXTII IS A REASONABLE AMOUNT FOR 
THE \VIDO\V'S ALLOWANCE IS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
17 
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The order appealed from (R. 69) recites that the 
court received evidence "on the matter" and recites that 
petitioner "is in need of an allowance from the estate 
for her support and maintenance; and that the sum of 
$250 per month is a reasonable allowance . . . " 
There is no evidence in the record to support this 
finding of fact. There is nothing to show whether Mrs. 
Hiatt has other income; whether she has any other 
means of support; whether she needs $50 or $5,000 
a month in addition to her other interests to support 
herself. The testimony of Mrs. Hiatt at the hearing 
was not recorded. At that time, the court indica ted from 
the bench that it would award, if anything, only $50.00 
per month, and that such award would not be retro· 
active to the date of death. If the widow is entitled to 
anything, it should be limited to that amount. 
This court has repeatedly held that an unsupported 
finding cannot stand and that a judgment based on 
an unsupported finding of fact will be reversed. The 
leading cases are: Hathaway v. United Tintic Mines Co. 
(1913) 42 Ut. 520, 132 P. 388; Greenhalgh v. United 
Pacific Mines Co. (1913) 42 Ut. 524, 132 P. 390. 
It is submitted that the rule applies with special 
force to this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent solemnly agreed, prior to her mar· 
riage, to waive all claims against the property of the 
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dt'l'l'drnt. both a~ wife and widow. The agreement is 
uruunbiguous. Hcs pondent as widow is claiming assets 
ot' the decedent through the device of a petition for 
widow's allowa11ce. The decree awarding such an allow-
ance is erroneous and should be reversed. 
E\'en if the rlecree is not reversed in full, to the 
extent that it finrls that the sum of $250 is a reasonable 
a lim' am·e for the support of respondent, it is unsup-
ported by the e\'idence. A new trial should be granted 
to determine the fact of the reasonableness of the allow-
nnce if the respondent is not bound by her agreement. 
Hespectfully submitted this 20th day of September, 
1 ~lti:J. 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN 
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR. 
I 020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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.APPEXDIX "A" 
.\XTE~CPTI.~.\L 1.\GREEMENT 
This ,\ ntenuptial 1\.green1ent made and entered 
into at Provo. tr tah, this 20th day of July, 1961, by and 
between A. L. IIiatt. otherwise known as Alma Leon 
Hintt, of Pro,·o, lTtah County, State of Utah, herein-
after for eonvenience referred to as husband, and Cecil 
X. James. otherwise known as Cecil Thelma Nelson 
.r amt·s. of ProYo, Utah County, State of Utah, herein-
after convenience referred to as wife, witnesseth: 
That whereas the parties hereto are contemplating 
legal marriage under the laws of the State of Utah, 
. \ nd whereas, each of the parties own certain real 
and persona 1 property, and it is their desire to settle 
the property rights of husband and wife after such 
marriage. 
And whereas, the husband desires to waive and re-
linquish any and all rights, either as husband or as 
wi<lowcr. in and to any property now owned by the wife, 
and 
\Yhereas, the wife desires to waive and relinquish 
a11y and all rights. either as wife or as widow, including 
right of Dower. in and to any and all property now 
owned hy the husband: 
XO\Y THEREFORE, in consideration of said 
proposed marriage and of the agreements of the hus-
hnnd and wife hereinafter stated, it is understood and 
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agreed that all of the properties of any name or nature, 
real, personal or mixed, wherever they may be found, 
belonging to the wife before this contemplated mar-
riage, shall be, and remain forever, her personal estate, 
and this shall include all interest, rents and profits which 
may in time accrue or result in any manner from increase 
in value, or be collected for the use of the same in any 
way. 
And it is further understood and agreed that all of 
the properties of any name or nature, real, personal 
or mixed, wherever they may be found, belonging to the 
husband before this contemplated marriage, shall be, 
and remain forever his personal estate, and this shall 
include all interest, rents and profits which may in time 
accrue or result in any manner from increase in value, 
or be collected for the use of the same in any way. 
And the wife further agrees to execute and ac-
knowledge, upon the request of the husband, or of his 
heirs, devisees, personal representatives or assigns, any 
and all proper instruments of release or conveyance 
to enable the husband, or his heirs, devisees, personal 
representatives or assigns, to sell, convey, release, or 
otherwise dispose of, any and all real estate now owned 
by the husband, free and clear of any and all rights, 
interests, or claims, including dower rights of the wife. 
And it is understood and agreed that each party 
to this agreement shall control their personal estate, as 
described herein, and do with the properties thereof, 
whatsoever they wish and will, by his or her orders or 
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dircl'tions, or by testament, the same as either could or 
would do if no marriage relation existed between them. 
1:\ \\'I TX ESS \VI-IEREOF. the parties have 
hereunto set their hands the day and date first above 
written. 
\Vitness: 
I> E.\:\ E. TERRY 
STATE OF UTAJI 
COrXTY OF UT.A.H ss. 
A.L.HIATT 
Husband 
CECIL N. JA~IES 
Wife 
On the 20th day of July, A.D. 1961, personally ap-
peared before 1ne, A. L. Hiatt, otherwise known as Alma 
Leon 1-1 ia tt. and Cecil N. James, otherwise known as 
Cecil Thelma X elson James, the signers of the within 
1 instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they 
: executed the smne. 
DEAN E. TERRY 
Notary Public 
Residing at Provo, Utah 
.)ly Commission Expires January 8, 1963. 
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